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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The nature of the case, statement of facts and course of proceedings are 
set forth in the Respondent's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference. 
The state submits this Supplemental Respondent's Brief to address Hochrein's 
claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the district court violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial by "accept[ing] a factual 
stipulation entered into by Mr. Hochrein's counsel that relieved the State of its 
burden of proof as to essential elements of the charged offense without 
obtaining Mr. Hochrein's personal waiver of his right to a jury determination as to 




Hochrein Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Showing That The District Court 
Committed Fundamental Error By Accepting The Parties' Factual Stipulation 
Without First Obtaining An On-The-The Record Waiver Of Hochrein's 
Constitutional Right To A JUry Trial 
A. Introduction 
Hochrein was charged with violating a no contact order that prohibited him 
from having contact with Tanya Lewis. (#38317 R., pp.33-34,64-66, 101-03.) At 
trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts: 
On January 28, 2010, a No Contact Order issued by a Court 
was in effect in Case No. CR2009-0002146. The No Contact 
Order was issued because the Defendant, Edward R. Hochrein, Jr., 
had been charged with or convicted of an offense for which the 
Court found that a No Contact Order was appropriate. The No 
Contact Order prohibited the Defendant from contacting Tanya 
Lewis. The No Contact Order also prohibited the Defendant from 
being at Ms. Lewis' residence. 
(State's Trial Exhibit 3A; Trial Tr., p.117, LS.17 -23, p.223, L.22 - p.224, L.18.) 
The written stipulation was signed by defense counsel and the prosecutor and 
was read to the jury and admitted as an exhibit at trial. (State's Trial Exhibit 3A; 
Trial Tr., p.223, L.22 - p.224, L.18.) Although Hochrein agreed, by way of the 
stipulation, that a no contact order had been issued and was in effect on the date 
of the charged offense, he presented an alibi defense (see generally Trial Tr., 
pp.225-70 (testimony of alibi witnesses)) and argued, through counsel, that he 
never had contact with Ms. Lewis on the date charged (see Trial Tr., p.133, L.23 
- p.141, L.14 (defense counsel representing during opening statement both that 
only issue before jury was whether Hochrein was the person who was at Ms. 
Lewis' residence on January 28th and that evidence would not support such 
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finding), p.303, L.23 - p.327, L.18 (defense counsel arguing during closing that 
only issue before jury, "really," was whether "Hochrein [was] outside the door at 
Tanya Lewis' apartment on January 28th" and that evidence did not support such 
finding)). The jury ultimately rejected Hochrein's alibi defense and found him 
guilty of violating the no contact order. (#38317 R., pp.130-31.) 
For first time on appeal, Hochrein argues that the district court erred by 
accepting the parties' factual stipulation without first conducting an on-the-record 
discussion of the stipulation with Hochrein and obtaining from him a personal 
waiver of his right to a jury determination of the facts addressed by the 
stipulation. (Supp. brief, pp.3-9.) According to Hochrein, because the stipulation 
was, in effect, an admission to several elements of the charged crime, the district 
court was required to advise him of the constitutional rights he was waiving and 
to obtain from him an explicit waiver of his right to a jury determination on each 
element of the crime charged. (Id.) The failure to do so, Hochrein contends, 
amounted to either structural or fundamental error and deprived Hochrein of his 
constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial. (Id.) 
Hochrein's argument is without merit. Unlike a guilty plea, an evidentiary 
stipulation that admits only some of the elements required for a conviction does 
not trigger a duty on the part of the trial court to obtain from the defendant an 
express waiver of the right to a jury determination on those elements. Because 
neither due process nor the right to a jury trial are even implicated by such 
stipulations, Hochrein's argument that the district court committed fundamental 
error by accepting the stipulation in this case without first obtaining an express 
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waiver from Hochrein of his right to a jury determination of each of the essential 
elements of the crime necessarily fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Absent a timely objection, the appellate 
courts of this state will only review an alleged error under the fundamental error 
doctrine. kL at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. 
C. Hochrein Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error 
Hochrein argues that, by accepting the parties' factual stipulation without 
ever obtaining from Hochrein a personal waiver of his right to a jury 
determination of the essential elements of the crime covered by the stipulation, 
"the district court violated Mr. Hochrein's well-established constitutional rights to 
due process and a fair triaL" (Supp. brief, p.5.). Because Hochrein did not raise 
this issue below he bears the burden on appeal of demonstrating fundamental 
error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). Review 
under the fundamental error doctrine requires Hochrein to demonstrate that the 
error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." kL at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. 
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Contrary to Hochrein's assertions on appeal, his claim of fundamental error fails 
on all three of the elements required by Perry. 
First, Hochrein has failed to demonstrate that the error he alleges violated 
one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights. Hochrein cites a number of 
cases standing for the general proposition that, in every criminal trial, the state 
carries the burden of proving every essential element of the charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Supp. brief, p.5 (citing, inter alia, Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 188 
P.3d 867, 884 (2008); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685, 227 P.3d 933, 939 
(Ct. App. 2010).) He also cites cases holding that the right to a jury 
determination as to the essential elements of the charged offense is personal to 
the defendant and, as such, defense counsel may not waive such right on the 
defendant's behalf, either by stipulating to the truth of all of the facts necessary 
for a conviction or enhancement of the charged offense, or by otherwise waiving 
altogether the defendant's right to a jury trial. (See Supp. brief, pp.6-8 (citing 
State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413, 80 P.3d 349 (Ct. App. 2003) (admission to 
truth of persistent violator enhancement); State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 703 
P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1985) (waiver of jury trial).) Hochrein, however, has failed to 
cite a single case that stands for the proposition he advocates in this case - i.e., 
that where the parties at trial stipulate to some, but not all, of the facts necessary 
for conviction of the charged offense, due process demands the trial court to 
conduct an on-the-record inquiry and obtain from the defendant a personal 
waiver of his or her right to a jury determination of each fact covered by the 
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stipulation. While Idaho's appellate courts have never considered the issue, a 
review of cases from other jurisdictions supports exactly the opposite 
proposition. 
In United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1980), for 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a claim, similar to that made 
by Hochrein in this case, that the trial court erred by accepting a factual 
stipulation without first questioning the defendant "personally as to the 
voluntariness of any stipulation of crucial fact." The stipulation at issue was 
signed by defense counsel and admitted "to only two elements of one of the 
offenses with which [Ferreboeuf] was charged." kL Given these circumstances, 
and citing its earlier opinion in United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 561 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1975), the Ferreboeuf court declined to adopt a rule requiring the trial 
court to ascertain from the defendant personally whether the stipulation was 
voluntarily given, noting that "[s]uch a rule would needlessly delay and confuse 
the conduct of a typical triaL" Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 836. Instead, the court 
held: 
[W]hen a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in 
open court in the presence of the defendant, and is agreed to by 
defendant's acknowledged counsel, the trial court may reasonably 
assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the stipulation 
and agrees to it through his or her attorney. Unless a criminal 
defendant indicates objection at the time the stipulation is made, he 
or she is ordinarily bound by such stipulation. 
kL (citations omitted). 
Following Ferreboeuf, the Ninth Circuit held in Adams v. Peterson, 968 
F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1992), that the due process protections attendant to the entry 
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of a formal guilty plea do not extend to stipulations of fact, even where those 
stipulations admit essential elements of the charged crime. Adams was charged 
with rape, burglary and sodomy. 1.9.:. at 836. At trial, the parties stipulated to a 
number of facts, all of which were necessary for Adams' conviction of the 
charged offenses. 1.9.:. at 836-37. On appeal from the dismissal of his habeas 
petition following his convictions, Adams argued that "his stipulation of facts at 
trial constituted a de facto guilty plea and that he was therefore entitled to the 
procedural protections attendant to the entering of such a plea." 1.9.:. at 839. 
Specifically, like Hochrein, Adams claimed a due process right to be advised by 
the judge in open court of his constitutional rights, including the right to be tried 
by a jury; and, he claimed, "the court had a constitutional obligation to establish 
on the record that he voluntarily and intelligently waived these rights." 1.9.:. (citing 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)) (footnote omitted). The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed, reasoning: 
Adams never stipulated that he was guilty of the crimes of 
burglary, rape, and sodomy; in fact, Adams pled not guilty to all 
three counts on which he was convicted by the trial court. Adams 
only stipulated that the enumerated facts were supported beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the evidence that the state possessed and 
would present at trial. A stipulation to facts from which a judge or 
jury may infer guilt is simply not the same as a stipulation to guilt, or 
a guilty plea. "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which 
admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; 
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." 
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711. If the Boykin Court itself 
recognized this distinction, then we are hardly in a position to 
ignore it - or to hold that the full Boykin protections extend to the 
circumstance of a stipulation. 
1.9.:. (emphasis original) (footnote omitted). 
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In rejecting Adams' claim that he was entitled to the full constitutional 
protections that attend the entry of a guilty plea, the Ninth Circuit referred 
specifically to its prior decision in United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 
1975), wherein the court held that the procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which apply to guilty pleas, do not apply to 
factual stipulations. Adams, 968 F.2d at 839-40. The Terrack court explained 
that, to read the rule otherwise "would unduly encumber trials now often 
shortened by stipulation of evidence and [stipulations] to identify exhibits, to 
specify the chain of custody, and other important matters. To require a Rule 11 
examination on every stipulation containing a vital admission of the defendant 
would add ritualistic formalities where none are needed nor required." Terrack, 
515 F.2d at 561 n.3, quoted in Adams, 968 F.2d at 840. 
Because the procedural requirements of Rule 11 are merely a codification 
of the constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea set out in Boykin, the 
Adams court concluded that the rationale of Terrack was equally applicable to 
and dispositive of Adams' constitutional claim. Adams, 968 F.2d at 840-41. 
That rationale was echoed by Judge Kozinski who, in his concurring opinion in 
Adams, agreed with the majority's conclusion that a formal guilty plea is 
necessary to trigger the due process requirements of Boykin, explaining that 
such conclusion is mandated, at least in part, by the realities of trial: 
Criminal prosecutions put a variety of facts at issue, but quite often 
only a few are genuinely in dispute. Stipulating to anyone of those 
facts - or agreeing to any procedural shortcut, for that matter - can 
fairly be characterized as giving up the defendant's substantial 
rights, perhaps even as tantamount to a guilty plea. 
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With the benefit of hindsight, a tactical concession might well 
look like a major turning point in the case, one which made the 
outcome a foregone conclusion. Yet, it would be entirely 
unworkable to demand a Boykin inquiry every time the defense and 
prosecution come to some arrangement - through stipulation, 
concession or whatever - that narrows the issues for trial. ... 
Because prophylactic rules such as Boykin are intended "to 
minimize the sum of error costs and administrative costs" of 
criminal trials, applying Boykin to concessions that are less than 
formal pleas of guilt would, in my judgment, be counter-productive 
and eventually lead to abandonment of the rule. Requiring a formal 
guilty plea as the trigger for a Boykin inquiry gives the rule a 
workable scope and focuses the attention of the court, the counsel 
and the defendant on the most serious waiver of rights in a criminal 
trial: a defendant's formal acceptance of guilt. 
Adams, 968 F.2d at 846-47 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
Other federal circuit courts of appeal "are in substantial agreement that 
where a defendant has pleaded not guilty and stipulates to evidentiary facts, 
even facts crucial to a conviction," neither the due process requirements of 
Boykin nor the advisories required by Rule 11 are applicable. People v. Adams, 
862 P.2d 831,839 (Cal. 1993) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Lyons, 898 F.2d 
210, 215 (1 st Cir. 1990); United States v. Robertson, 698 F.2d 703, 705 (5th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Stadler, 696 F.2d 59, 60 (8th Cir. 1982); Witherspoon V. 
United States, 633 F.2d 1247, 1250 (6th Cir. 1980)). In addition, at least one 
state court has held that "[t]he constitution does not compel a full Boykin colloquy 
in the absence of a formal guilty plea." State V. Allen, 220 P.3d 245, 248 (Ariz. 
2009) (citing Adams, 968 F.2d at 841, 845). Numerous others have similarly 
concluded that, unless a factual stipulation is "tantamount to a guilty plea" - i.e. it 
admits all of the essential facts or elements necessary for conviction or 
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enhancement of the charged crime - there is no constitutional requirement that 
the trial court inquire of the defendant and obtain a personal waiver of the right to 
a jury determination as to each of the facts covered by the stipulation. See, SUL., 
State v. Humphries, 285 P.3d 917, 923 (Wash. App. 2012) (and cases cited 
therein) ("[E]ntry of a stipulation to less than all elements of the offense does not 
require the same level of trial court inquiry that would accompany the entry of a 
guilty plea."); Commonwealth v. Walorz, 944 N.E.2d 1061 (Mass. App. 2011) (no 
colloquy required where stipulation was not sufficient, by itself, to sustain 
conviction for charged offense); In re Detention of Moore, 216 P.3d 1015, 1020 
(Wash. 2009) (En banc) (in a criminal case "due process [does] not require the 
trial court to ensure that a defendant understands the rights waived by a factual 
stipulation as long as the stipulation is not tantamount to a guilty plea"); People v. 
Phillips, 840 N.E.2d 1194, 1203 (III. 2005) ("[I]t is only when counsel's 
stipulations render defendant's trial the practical equivalent of a plea of guilty that 
a defendant must be personally admonished about the stipulation and must 
personally agree to the stipulation." (citations and internal quotations omitted)); 
People v. Newman, 981 P.2d 98, 103-04 (Cal. 1999) (trial court was not required 
to provide constitutional advisements and obtain defendant's waiver before 
permitting defendant to stipulate, through counsel, to one element of charged 
enhancement; no penal consequences flowed directly from the stipulation, and 
the prosecutor still was required to prove the remaining elements of the offense); 
Adams, 862 P.2d at 836-39 (defendant's stipulation to some, but not all, of the 
evidentiary facts or elements necessary to imposition of punishment on charged 
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enhancement, as opposed to admission to truth of enhancing allegation, did not 
trigger Boykin due process requirements). 
Idaho's appellate courts have never considered the precise issue raised 
by Hochrein in this case. As is evident from the foregoing discussion, however, 
the weight of authority from other jurisdictions holds that the due process 
protections that are attendant to a guilty plea do not apply to factual stipulations 
that admit only some of the facts necessary for conviction of the charged offense 
or enhancement. Pursuant to the factual stipulation in this case, Hochrein 
admitted only that, on January 28, 2010, a no contact order was in effect that 
prohibited Hochrein both from contacting Tanya Lewis and from being at her 
residence. (State's Trial Exhibit 3A) Conspicuously absent from the stipulation 
was any admission by Hochrein that he actually violated that order by engaging 
in the prohibited contact. (Compare State's Trial Exhibit 3A with #38317 R., 
p.151 (elements instruction requiring state to prove Hochrein violated the no 
contact order "by going within 200 feet of Tanya Lewis' residence").) In fact, 
Hochrein specifically disputed this essential element of the crime through the 
presentation of three alibi witnesses (see generally Trial Tr., pp.225-70) and his 
trial counsel's argument that Hochrein never had contact with Ms. Lewis on the 
date charged (see generally Trial Tr., pp.133-141, 303-27). 
Because Hochrein exercised his right to a jury trial, and because the 
stipulation at issue admitted only some, but not all, of the elements necessary for 
a conviction of the charged offense, the trial court was not required, before 
accepting the stipulation, to advise Hochrein of his constitutional rights and 
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obtain a personal waiver thereof. ~,People v. Little, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 446, 455 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[Because a stipulation to some but not all of the 
elements of a crime or enhancement has no penal consequences comparable to 
those that flow from a confession or guilty plea, such a stipulation does not raise 
the constitutional concerns that prompted the [Boykin] requirements, especially 
when the defendant who makes the stipulation also asserts his or her right to a 
trial and waives no constitutional rights." (Citation omitted)). In addition, because 
the stipulation was "entered into the record in open court in the presence of 
[Hochrein], and [was] agreed to by [Hochrein's] acknowledged counsel, the trial 
court [could] reasonably assume that [Hochrein was] aware of the content of the 
stipulation and agree[d] to it through his ... attorney." Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 
836. Hochrein has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court violated 
any of his unwaived constitutional rights by not requiring a personal waiver in 
open court from Hochrein. 
Hochrein has also failed to show that the error he alleges "plainly exists 
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision)." Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Hochrein argues that the 
error he claims is plain due to the "absence of any valid waiver, made personally 
and on the record by Mr. Hochrein" in this case. (Supp. brief, p.?) Because, as 
discussed above, due process does not require a trial court to conduct an on-
the-record inquiry and obtain from a defendant a personal waiver of the right to a 
jury determination of the facts contained in a stipulation that admits only some 
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elements of the charged offense, Hochrein has failed to show any error at all, 
much less one that is plain. Nor can Hochrein show from the record that trial 
counsel's decision to enter into the stipulation and submit it to the jury, without 
first requiring the trial court to conduct an on-the-record inquiry and obtain from 
Hochrein a personal waiver of his right to a jury determination of the facts 
admitted to in the stipulation, was anything but sound trial strategy. 
Unlike the decision to waive a jury trial, which rests solely with a criminal 
defendant, see State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 965-66, 703 P.2d 727, 729-30 (Ct. 
App. 1985), the decision to enter into factual stipulations that narrow the issues 
for trial falls squarely within the realm of tactical decisions that trial counsel has 
the discretion to make, SUL., Adams, 862 P.2d at 836 ("Evidentiary stipulations 
have long been recognized as tactical trial decisions which counsel has 
discretion to make without the express authority of the client." (citations 
omitted»; Phillips, 840 N.E.2d at 1204-05 (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 
745, 751-52 (1983» ('''Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have 
emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments and focusing at 
most on a few key issues."'); People v. Clendenin, 939 N.E.2d 310, 325 (III. 
2010) (decision by defense counsel to proceed by stipulation, while still 
preserving a defense, was matter of trial tactics and strategy). Indeed, as 
observed by one court: 
Since an evidentiary stipulation is, in effect, nothing more than an 
acknowledgement of what a witness would testify to if called, and a 
concomitant decision not to challenge the testimony the witness 
would give, a stipulation is not much different from a decision not to 
cross-examine. The notion that a defendant would have to 
approve every aspect of defense counsel's cross-examination -
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including "whether and how to conduct cross-examination" -
highlights the impracticality of [a] procedure [that would require a 
defendant, in every conceivable situation, to be advised of the 
implications and consequences of a stipulation and to approve it on 
the record]. 
Phillips, 840 N.E.2d at 1202-03 (emphasis original); accord Adams, 862 P.2d at 
836 ("If it really follows from Boykin that every purported waiver of every 
constitutional right must be affirmatively shown to have been personally and 
intelligently made by the client, it would be necessary to stop the proceedings 
and have a hearing on that question every time the attorney declines to cross-
examine a witness or fails to object to inadmissible evidence." (Citations and 
internal quotations omitted)). 
The stipulation entered into by defense counsel in this case narrowed the 
issues for trial to the only contested element of the crime, that being whether 
Hochrein had contact with Tanya Lewis in violation of the no contact order. That 
defense counsel chose to stipulate to the existence and validity of the no contact 
order rather than requiring the state to present evidence as to these facts is 
hardly surprising since there can be no doubt that the state could easily have 
proved the fact of the no contact order by calling one or more foundational 
witnesses and introducing the order as an exhibit. Moreover, by stipulating to the 
fact of the no contact order, defense counsel likely kept out of evidence other 
potentially prejudicial information, including the details of an intimidating a 
witness charge that led to the issuance of the order. (See #38317 Prelim. 
Hearing Exhibit 4 (no contact order indicating Hochrein had "been charged with 
or convicted of' intimidating a witness, Tanya Lewis)); see Phillips, 840 N.E.2d at 
14 
1201 ("As a matter of trial strategy, defense counsel might choose to stipulate to 
evidence in an effort to minimize the adverse impact it will have at trial."). From 
this record, Hochrein cannot show that trial counsel's decision to enter the 
stipulation and focus exclusively on establishing an alibi defense was anything 
but a tactical decision. 
Finally, Hochrein has failed to demonstrate prejudice. See Perry, 150 
Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980 (third prong of fundamental error test requires 
defendant to show that claimed error "was not harmless"). Hochrein argues that 
the error he claims is structural, and therefore not subject to harmless error 
analysis, because "[i]n the case of a factual stipulation that relieves the State of 
its burden of proof as to every element, because the stipulation is the only 
'evidence" on the issue, there could be no verdict as to every element of the 
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of the 
stipulation." (Supp. brief, p.8 (emphasis added).) Hochrein's argument fails on 
its premise because as discussed above, and as even Hochrein concedes on 
appeal, the stipulation in this case admitted only some, not all, of the elements 
the state was required to prove to secure a conviction on the violation of a no 
contact order charge. (See Supp. brief, pp.4, 9 (stipulation covered "several 
elements" of charged offense).) 
For this same reason, Hochrein cannot demonstrate actual prejudice. 
Hochrein does not contend that he actually misunderstood the stipulation, that 
he had insufficient time to discuss it with counsel, that he was unaware of its 
effect, or even that entered into it, through counsel, other than knowingly, 
15 
voluntarily and intelligently. Because Hochrein's rights to a jury trial and due 
process were not even implicated by the stipulation that admitted only some of 
the elements of the crime and that was entered into by defense counsel on 
Hochrein's behalf and in his presence, the district court was not required to 
obtain from Hochrein any on-the-record assurance that Hochrein's decision to 
enter into the stipulation was voluntary. See Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d at 836. 
Hochrein has failed to establish any error at all, let alone any prejudicial error 
that affected the outcome of the proceedings. Hochrein's claim of fundamental 
error thus fails on all three prongs of Perry, and this Court must decline to review 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon jury verdicts finding Hochrein guilty of felony violation of a no contact order 
and being a persistent violator. 
DATED this 5th day of November 2012. 
~.~~ .. ORIA. FLEMIN 
Deputy Attorney General 
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